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HOW BIZARRE?: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF THE
REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
FOR "REGARDED AS" DISABLED EMPLOYEES UNDER
THE ADA IN WILLIAMS v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING
A UTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ad-
ded to the split among federal courts as to whether the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)I requires employers to make reasonable accommo-
dation for employees who are "regarded as" disabled. 2 Specifically, in the
case of Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department,3 the
court held that reasonable accommodations for these persons are re-
quired. 4 Still, many other federal courts have determined that, despite the
language of the ADA, such accommodations are not required because
they would lead to "bizarre results."
5
The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against qualified indi-
viduals because of their disabilities. 6 A qualified individual is "an individ-
ual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such indi-
vidual holds or desires."7 There are three categories of disabilities that are
protected by the ADA: (1) physical or mental impairments that substan-
tially limit major life activities; (2) a record of an impairment; and (3)
1. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12182 (2005) (prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties). For a discussion of the relevant language of the ADA, see infra notes 6-10
and accompanying text.
2. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 773 (3d Cir.
2004) (holding that reasonable accommodations are required), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 1725 (2005). "[T]he 3rd Circuit clarified that employers must accommodate
employees that they 'regard as' disabled." Adam Long, Duty to Disabled Employees
and Applicants Under the ADA, TH-E LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 2, 2004, at 5.
3. 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725 (2005).
4. See id. at 773 (finding that reasonable accommodation requirement applies
to "regarded as" disabled employees).
5. See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003)
(recognizing that majority of federal courts deciding this issue have determined
that no requirement exists because it would lead to bizarre results), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1049 (2003). For a discussion of cases holding that no requirement exists
under the ADA, see infra notes 47-75 and accompanying text.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (stating general rule). "No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id.
7. See id. § 12111(8) (defining qualified individual).
(1213)
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being regarded as having an impairment.8 The definition of discrimina-
tion includes failure to make a reasonable accommodation for a qualified
disabled individual. 9 Although the language of the ADA clearly includes
people that are "regarded as" disabled in its protected class, a debate exists
among federal courts as to whether such claimants are entitled to reasona-
ble accommodation. 10
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit's recent determination that
employers are required to make reasonable accommodations for employ-
ees who are "regarded as" disabled. I" Part II reviews the pertinent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the current split
among the federal courts over whether accommodation is required for
employees who are "regarded as" disabled.12 Part III analyzes Williams,
explicating the Third Circuit's reasoning for its conclusion that accommo-
dation is required in such cases.13 Part IV concludes with a discussion of
the Third Circuit's analysis, how practitioners should counsel their clients
in the Third Circuit in light of Williams and the types of claims that the
Williams decision will likely impact.
1 4
8. See id. § 12102(2) (defining disability). For an in-depth discussion of each
category of disability, see ANDREW J. RuzicHO & Louis A. JACOBS, EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES MANUAL § 6:4 (2004) (providing examples and explanations of catego-
ries of disabilities).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (explaining that refusing reasonable ac-
commodation for known physical or mental limitations of otherwise qualified indi-
vidual constitutes discrimination). Numerous other actions also constitute
discrimination under the ADA. See id. § 12112 (defining discrimination). Some
other examples of discrimination are using standards or tests to screen out individ-
uals with disabilities, using standards or criteria that create discrimination on the
basis of disability and excluding or denying jobs to an individual because of a disa-
bility. See id. § 12112 (b) (3A), (4), (6) (delineating actions constituting discrimina-
tion). Under the ADA, "[r]easonable accommodation is any modification or
adjustment to ajob or the work environment that will enable a qualified applicant
or employee with a disability to participate in the application process or to per-
form essential job functions." Job Accommodation Network, ADA Questions and
Answers, at http://www.jan.wvu.edu/links/ADAq&a.html (last updated Oct. 7,
2003) [hereinafter ADA Questions and Answers].
10. For a discussion of federal court decisions holding that no reasonable ac-
commodation is required, see infra notes 47-75 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of courts holding that reasonable accommodation is required, see infra
notes 76-105 and accompanying text. Additionally, for a discussion of the Third
Circuit's decision requiring reasonable accommodation, see infra notes 106-56 and
accompanying text.
11. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's holding in Williams, see infra notes
125-56 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions on "regarded as" disabled
claims, see infra notes 15-43 and accompanying text. For an analysis of federal
court decisions on whether accommodation is required for employees who are
"regarded as" disabled, see infra notes 44-105 and accompanying text.
13. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's reasoning in Williams, see infra notes
125-56 and accompanying text.
14. For a concluding discussion of the Williams decision and the impact of
this decision on future cases and practitioners in the Third Circuit, see infra notes
157-75 and accompanying text.
1214
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A. Guidance from the Supreme Court on "Regarded As" Disabled Claims
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of reasona-
ble accommodation for "regarded as" disabled employees under the ADA
specifically, it has provided some guidance on "regarded as" claims gener-
ally. 15 The Court has recognized the importance of providing protection
for individuals who are "regarded as" disabled because of the dramatic
effects such misperceptions may have on these persons. 16 Additionally,
the Court has defined the categories of individuals who fall within the
definition of "regarded as" disabled.
1 7
1. The Court's Interpretation of "Regarded As" Disabled Under the
Rehabilitation Act
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,18 the Court examined the
"regarded as" provision of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation
Act"). 19 The ADA is similar to the Rehabilitation Act, and Congress in-
tended the ADA to provide at least the same, if not more, protection. 20 In
Arline, the Court recognized the congressional intent to protect individu-
15. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (explain-
ing two categories of individuals who would fall within "regarded as" disabled pro-
vision of ADA); Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284-86 (1987)
(discussing "regarded as" provision under Rehabilitation Act). For further discus-
sion of Sutton and Arline, see infra notes 18-43 and accompanying text.
16. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 (explaining that those who are misperceived as
being disabled need protection against societal stereotypes and fears concerning
persons with disabilities). For a further discussion on the need for protection for
"regarded as" disabled employees, see infra notes 20, 24-28 and accompanying text.
17. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (defining "regarded as" disabled categories of
plaintiffs). For a further discussion of the Court's interpretation of the definition
of "regarded as" disabled, see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
18. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
19. See id. at 277-80 (discussing Rehabilitation Act and its protections). See
generally Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-3007 (2004) (prohibiting dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities). The Rehabilitation Act provides ad-
vocacy and protection for persons with disabilities. See Dep't of Educ., The
Rehabilitation Act, available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/reg/narrative.
html (last visitedJune 18, 2005). It also authorizes grant programs for "vocational
rehabilitation, supported employment, independent living, and client assistance"
for persons with disabilities. See id. (describing Rehabilitation Act).
20. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998)) (explaining relation
between ADA and Rehabilitation Act), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725 (2005). Con-
gress realized that the Rehabilitation Act did not provide sufficient protection to
individuals in employment and, therefore, enacted the ADA. See Michelle A.
Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of
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als from the myths and stereotypes about disabilities that exist in society
and can lead to discrimination in employment.
2 1
Gene Arline, an elementary school teacher with tuberculosis, was ter-
minated from her position because of her illness.22 The Court deter-
mined that Arline was disabled as defined by the Rehabilitation Act.
2 3 It
then rejected the school district's argument that there was a difference
between the contagiousness of a disease, which would not be protected
under the Rehabilitation Act, and the effects of the disease on the individ-
ual employee, which would be protected.24 According to the Court, both
result from the same disease and are both protected.
2 5
The main focus in Arline was on the employee's actual disability.
26
Nevertheless, the Court also discussed the importance of the "regarded as"
clause. 27 The Court found that, by inserting this clause in the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress acknowledged that societal stereotypes about individu-
als with a disease or disability could be just as disabling as the actual
physical impairments of a disability.28 Therefore, the Rehabilitation Act
requires an inquiry into whether the employee is otherwise qualified for
the job before there is a violation.2 9 If a court finds that a person is other-
wise qualified, it must then determine whether the employer could pro-
vide reasonable accommodation. 30 "Employers have an affirmative
obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped em-
ployee .... [T] hey cannot deny an employee alternative employment op-
21. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 (analyzing legislative history of Rehabilitation
Act).
22. See id. at 276 (stating facts of case). Arline was terminated after several
relapses of the disease during a two year period. See id. (explaining that Arline was
"discharged in 1979 after suffering a third relapse of tuberculosis within two
years").
23. See id. at 281 (determining that Arline had physical impairment and re-
cord of physical impairment, which satisfied requirement of disability under Reha-
bilitation Act).
24. See id. at 282 (stating school district's argument).
25. See id. ("It would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the distinc-
tion between the effects of a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a
patient and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment.").
26. See id. at 276-89 (analyzing disability and its effect on ability to perform
job). The Court ultimately held that it could not determine whether Arline was
otherwise qualified for the job, and therefore, the case was remanded for further
fact finding. See id. at 287 (explaining need for fact finding to determine whether
individual is being discriminated against and to balance against other interests,
including safety and health risks to others).
27. See id. at 286-89 (looking at congressional intent to include protection
against misperceptions of disability).
28. See id. at 284 (stating congressional reasoning for extension of Rehabilita-
tion Act to include individuals "regarded as" disabled).
29. See id. at 287 (explaining that protection is only afforded to handicapped
individuals who are otherwise qualified for job).
30. See id. at 288 (asserting multiple steps that courts must employ when ana-
lyzing disability cases under Rehabilitation Act).
[Vol. 50: p. 12131216
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portunities reasonably available under the employer's existing policies."3 1
Some federal courts consider this affirmative obligation as binding prece-
dent, requiring reasonable accommodation for "regarded as" disabled em-
ployees under the ADA. 32
2. The Supreme Court's Definition of "Regarded As" Disabled
The Supreme Court provided specific guidance on ADA "regarded
as" claims in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.33 In Sutton, twin sisters with se-
vere myopia claimed discrimination on the basis of their disability or, in
the alternative, because they were "regarded as" disabled in violation of
the ADA.3 4 Specifically, the sisters had applied to United for the position
of global pilot, but United rejected them because they did not meet the
vision requirement.35
In its analysis, the Court first determined that the sisters were not ac-
tually disabled as defined under the ADA because with contacts or glasses
their vision was perfect.36 The Court then turned to the "regarded as"
claim.3 7 Here, it noted two categories in which this type of claim could
fall: "(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or
(2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting im-
pairment substantially limits one or more major life activities."3 8 The re-
31. Id. at 289 n.19.
32. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citing Arline as basis for interpreting plain language of ADA to require
reasonable accommodations for "regarded as" disabled employees), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 1725 (2005).
33. See generally Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489-93 (1999)
(discussing requirements of "regarded as" claims under ADA).
34. See id. at 475-76 (summarizing facts).
35. See id. at 476 ("Both were told during their interviews [with United], how-
ever, that a mistake had been made in inviting them to interview because petition-
ers did not meet respondent's minimum vision requirement. . . ."). Each sister's
eyesight was 20/200 in the right eye and 20/400 in the left, but with contacts or
glasses they both had 20/20 vision. See id. at 475 (detailing impairment). United
had a "minimum vision requirement, which was uncorrected visual acuity of 20/
100 or better." Id. at 476. United informed the sisters that, because they did not
meet this requirement, they would not be offered a pilot position. See id. (explain-
ing reason for rejection of applications).
36. See id. at 488-89 (concluding that sisters failed to state claim of actual disa-
bility). Although it is not relevant to the discussion in this Casebrief, the Court
also made the important determination that a disability under the ADA should be
determined with reference to possible corrective measures (i.e., vision with con-
tacts). See id. at 482 (deciding that logical definition of disability must take into
consideration remedies for impairment). For a discussion of the issues involved in
requiring employees to mitigate their disabilities, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REv. 217, 219-40 (2004) (discuss-
ing reasons why some people do not mitigate their disabilities and proposing stan-
dard of reasonableness be used in requirement to mitigate).
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quired misperceptions, according to the Court, are usually based on
stereotypes and not on the individual's actual ability.3 9
The Court then provided that if plaintiffs claim that a misperception
substantially limits them in the major life activity of working, at a mini-
mum, they must show that they cannot work in a specific class of jobs.40
Relying on this standard, the Court held that the sisters did not adequately
allege that a misperception of their disability substantially limited them in
the major life activity of working.4 1 Instead, the sisters only proved that
they were unable to work in one position, global pilot, but were qualified
for numerous other positions, including commercial airline co-pilots.
42
Therefore, they were not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.43
39. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (7) (2005)) (asserting requirement of mis-
perception by employer about individual employee). For further discussion on the
reasoning for protected "regarded as" claims, see supra notes 27-32 and accompa-
nying text.
40. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (analyzing how to prove substantial limitation in
major life activity of working). The definition that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) uses for substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working is:
[S]ignificantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class ofjobs or
a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average per-
son having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to per-
form a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in
the major life activity of working.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)). The EEOC also identified several
factors for courts to consider, which include the geographical area where the
plaintiff resides and the "number and types ofjobs utilizing similar training, knowl-
edge, skills or abilities, within the geographical area, from which the individual is
also disqualified." Id. at 492 (citing 29 C.F.R §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (A), (B)). The
Court summarized the requirements for such a claim as:
[O]ne must be precluded from more than one type ofjob, a specialized
job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills
(but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not pre-
cluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different
types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of
jobs.
Id.
41. See id. (concluding that sisters did not have valid claim of "regarded as"
disabled). The Court also emphasized that it was not deciding whether working
was really a major life activity and noted that even the EEOC was reluctant to do so.
See id. (explaining hesitancy to consider working as major life activity because of
conceptual problems); cf Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280
(1987) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1985)) (explaining definition of major
life activity to include working under Rehabilitation Act).
42. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493 (suggesting numerous other positions poten-
tially available to sisters).
43. See id. (analyzing why claim failed).
6
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B. The Two Views of the Federal Courts on the Requirement for Reasonable
Accommodation in "Regarded As" Disabled Claims
The federal courts are split over whether reasonable accommodation
is required under the ADA for "regarded as" disabled employees. 4 4 Some
courts do not require accommodations for these individuals, holding that
such a requirement would be an odd result.4 5 Other federal courts, how-
ever, have decided that because the language of the ADA does not differ-
entiate between an actual disability and "regarded as" disabled claims,
accommodations must be afforded to both.
46
1. Decisions That Find a Reasonable Accommodation Requirement "Bizarre"
Several federal courts, including the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, have
determined that the ADA does not require reasonable accommodation for
employees that are "regarded as" disabled.4 7 These courts concluded that
requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodation for "regarded
as" disabled individuals would create "bizarre results."48 This interpreta-
tion of the ADA has been the predominant view until recently. 49
44. See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that "regarded as" disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable
accommodation), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186
F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); cf Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police
Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 776 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing entitlement to reasonable
accommodation for "regarded as" disabled employees), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725
(2005); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); Jacques v.
DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same). The Seventh and
the Second Circuits have declined to address the issue. See Cameron v. Cmty. Aid
For Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing but not
deciding issue); Mack v. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 783 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002)
(same).
45. For a discussion of this line of decisions, see infra notes 47-75 and accom-
panying text.
46. For a discussion of decisions requiring reasonable accommodation, see
infra notes 76-105 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232-33 (holding that "regarded as" disabled
plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation); Weber, 186 F.3d at 917
(same); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (asserting
that "regarded as" plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation); New-
berry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). The courts
in Workman and Newberry decided the issue without analysis. See Workman, 165 F.3d
at 467 (finding that "regarded as" plaintiffs are not entitled to accommodation);
Newberry, 161 F.3d at 280 (determining that there is no requirement of reasonable
accommodation).
48. See, e.g., Weber, 186 F.3d at 916 ("Imposing liability on employers who fail
to accommodate non-disabled employees who are simply regarded as disabled
would lead to bizarre results.").
49. See 'Regarded As' Disabled Plaintiffs Entitled to Reasonable Accommodations, 16
No. 18 ANDREWS EMP. LrriG. REP. 5 (2002) (examining cases deciding issue of rea-
sonable accommodation). "Prior to Weber, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits had held
that 'regarded as' disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommoda-
tions, and, subsequent to Weber, seven out-of-circuit courts had weighed in on the
matter, and all had followed the holding and reasoning in Weber .... ." Id.
7
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The Eighth Circuit in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.50 was one of the first circuit
courts to determine that reasonable accommodation is not required for
"regarded as" disabled employees. 5 1 Strippit employed David Weber as an
international sales manager.5 2 Weber suffered a major heart attack in
1993 and continued to have health problems for the next year; despite his
health problems, he completed his job responsibilities during this time.53
Strippit informed Weber that he would have to relocate in order to keep
his job or accept a different position with lower pay.54 Weber told Strippit
that his physician advised him not to relocate for six months because of his
health. 55 Strippit refused to give Weber six months to relocate, and
Weber was either terminated or he left the job.56
After dealing with other claims, the court addressed the issue of rea-
sonable accommodation.5 7 The court noted that a requirement of reason-
able accommodation is clear and easy to apply in cases where the plaintiff
is actually disabled.58 Under the ADA, an employer cannot terminate dis-
abled individuals because of their disability without first making reasona-
ble accommodation. 59 According to the court, it does not make sense to
extend this requirement to an employee who is only misperceived as being
50. 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999).
51. See id. at 917 (deciding accommodation not required).
52. See id. at 910 (stating facts).
53. See id. (discussing Weber's health condition).
54. See id. (explaining Strippit's terms for continued employment).
55. See id. (explaining problems leading to termination and suit).
56. See id. (discussing final communications between Weber and Strippit).
The record is not clear as to whether Weber was terminated or considered to have
abandoned his employment. See id. (noting Weber's loss of employment).
57. See id. at 914-16 (determining that Weber was not actually disabled be-
cause he did not prove he was substantially limited in major life activity). The
court noted:
The first element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination re-
quired Weber to demonstrate that he was "disabled" within the meaning
of the ADA. The second element, which is the focus of the present analy-
sis, required him to demonstrate that he was a "qualified individual,"
which the ADA defines as an individual "who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires." This inquiry has two
prongs. "First, a court must determine whether the individual satisfies
the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related require-
ments of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.
Second, it must determine whether the individual, with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the posi-
tion held or sought."
Id. at 916 (citing Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 142-45 (3d Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 163, app. § 1630.2(m) (1998))).
58. See id. (discussing reasonable accommodation in relation to actual
disability).
59. See id. (indicating that reasonable accommodation must allow disabled
person to perform essential functions of job).
[Vol. 50: p. 12131220
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disabled. 60 The court provided a very limited analysis when reaching its
decision, citing only two cases. 61 Nevertheless, it held that it is unreasona-
ble to conclude that Congress intended the ADA to create disparities in
the treatment of similarly impaired, non-disabled employees.
62
The Ninth Circuit provided additional guidance in concluding that
accommodation is not required in Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas.63 Fred-
erick Kaplan, a peace officer, severely injured his hand during a training
exercise. 64 Kaplan was then misdiagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis and
was terminated based on the assumption that he could not hold a gun.
65
After concluding that Kaplan could not perform the essential job
functions of a peace officer, the court considered reasonable accommoda-
tion.66 Because Kaplan was terminated based on a misdiagnosis, his claim
60. See id. (analyzing results of requiring accommodation for non-disabled
employee). The court provided a hypothetical to demonstrate why reasonable ac-
commodations do not make sense for a "regarded as" disabled employee:
Assume, for instance, that Weber's heart condition prevented him from
relocating to Akron but did not substantially limit any major life activity.
Absent a perceived disability, defendants could terminate Weber without
exposing themselves to liability under the ADA. If the hypothetical is al-
tered, however, such that defendants mistakenly perceive Weber's heart
condition as substantially limiting one or more major life activities, de-
fendants would be required to reasonably accommodate Weber's condi-
tion by, for instance, delaying his relocation to Akron. Although Weber's
impairment is no more severe in this example than in the first, Weber
would now be entitled to accommodations for a non-disabling impair-
ment that no similarly situated employees would enjoy.
Id.
61. See id. at 916-17 (discussing opinions of other courts). The court noted
that the First Circuit in Katz decided to leave the decision of whether accommoda-
tion was required to the jury. See id. (citing Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 29
(1st Cir. 1996)) (noting indirect decision by First Circuit). Additionally, the court
focused on a decision by the Third Circuit, which did not decide the issue of ac-
commodation for "regarded as" disabled employees, but provided some insight.
See id. at 917 (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 148-49 n.12) (describing reasoning of Third
Circuit that accommodations are not required). In Deane, the Third Circuit con-
sidered the potential windfall that a plaintiff could receive and the potential for
unsubstantiated claims as two reasons against finding a requirement of accommo-
dation. See id. (analyzing whether "regarded as" disabled plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable accommodation but not deciding issue); see also Weber, 186 F.3d at 917
(noting dicta in Deane); cf. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d
751, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing entitlement of "regarded as" employee to
reasonable accommodation), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725 (2005). For further dis-
cussion of the Third Circuit's most recent analysis in Williams, see infra notes 106-
56 and accompanying text.
62. See Weber, 186 F.3d at 917 (refusing to read such disparate treatment of
similarly disabled employees into ADA).
63. 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing reasonable accommo-
dation debate), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003).
64. See id. at 1227 (stating facts).
65. See id. at 1228-29 (discussing misdiagnosis and resulting termination).
66. See id. at 1230 (reviewing job description and medical condition of plain-
tiff). "As part of the essential job functions ... Kaplan was required to restrain
prisoners, use firearms, and engage in hand-to-hand combat." Id. Kaplan admit-
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was under the "regarded as" disabled prong of the ADA.6 7 When deter-
mining whether Kaplan was entitled to reasonable accommodation, an is-
sue of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, the court began with the
language of the ADA.68 It recognized that the plain language suggested
that "regarded as" employees are entitled to accommodations because the
text does not distinguish between the three categories of disability.69
The analysis was not yet complete because other courts had argued
that a literal reading of the text leads to "bizarre results."70 The court next
considered the reasoning used by the Eighth Circuit in Weber, namely, that
Congress did not intend to create such disparities in the ADA.7 1 It found
this reasoning persuasive and determined that no accommodations were
required.7 2
If we were to conclude that "regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable accommodation, impaired employees would be better
off under the statute if their employers treated them as disabled
even if they were not. This would be a perverse and troubling
result under a statute aimed at decreasing stereotyp[es] .... 73
According to the court, providing accommodations to "regarded as"
disabled employees would help to perpetuate stereotypes about people
with disabilities.7 4 Additionally, the court concluded that it would be a
waste of resources to require employers to accommodate individuals who
are only "regarded as" disabled.7 5
ted during pretrial discovery that he was unable to perform the functions of his job
because of the pain and condition of his hand. See id. (explaining plaintiff's condi-
tion at time of termination).
67. See id. at 1231 (explaining basis for claim).
68. See id. at 1231-32 (performing own analysis even though weight of circuit
authority suggests that no accommodation is required).
69. See id. at 1232 (examining text of ADA for guidance).
70. See id. (reasoning that plain language was not determinative).
71. See id. (noting Eighth Circuit's decision).
72. See id. (accepting Eighth Circuit's analysis).
73. Id.
74. See id. (asserting that requiring accommodation is wrong result). The
court further explained its decision to require reasonable accommodations for a
"regarded as" disabled employee:
Were we to entitle "regarded as" employees to reasonable accommoda-
tion, it would do nothing to encourage those employees to educate em-
ployers of their capabilities, and do nothing to encourage employers to
see their employees' talents clearly; instead, it would improvidently pro-
vide those employees a windfall if they perpetuated their employers' mis-
perception of a disability.
Id.
75. See id. (suggesting that limited resources should be spent on individuals
with actual disabilities).
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2. Decisions in Favor of Reasonable Accommodation for "Regarded As"
Disabled Employees
Fewer federal courts have held that reasonable accommodation is re-
quired for "regarded as" disabled employees. 76 The First Circuit in Katz v.
City Metal CO. 7 7 was the first federal court of appeals to decide the issue of
reasonable accommodation in favor of the "regarded as" plaintiffs. 78 In
Katz, the plaintiff was terminated after he suffered a heart attack.79 The
court determined that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that he
was "regarded as" disabled and that he could perform the job with reason-
able accommodation.80 Without analyzing whether the ADA required the
employer to make reasonable accommodation, the court assumed such a
requirement and determined that reasonable accommodation could have
been granted.8 1
The United States District Court for the District of Maine further sub-
stantiated the Katz decision in Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co.8 2 In Jewell,
the plaintiff suffered two heart attacks and had a defibrillator implanted;
he was terminated shortly thereafter.8 3 In its analysis, the court deter-
mined that Carl Jewell successfully proved that he was misperceived as dis-
abled and that he could have performed the essential functions of the
76. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d
Cir. 2004) (holding that reasonable accommodation is required in "regarded as"
disabled claims), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725 (2005); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d
26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (recognizing entitlement to reasonable accommodation for
"regarded as" disabled plaintiff); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151,
166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that reasonable accommodation is needed);Jewell v.
Reid's Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218 (D. Me. 2001) (same).
77. 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996).
78. See id. at 33 (holding that "regarded as" disabled plaintiff provided suffi-
cient evidence that he could perform job with reasonable accommodation).
79. See id. at 28-29 (discussing facts). The company told the plaintiff that he
should recuperate and worry about work later. See id. at 29 (stating communica-
tion with defendant). One month later, the plaintiff received a call that he was
discharged. See id. (explaining termination).
80. See id. at 33 (determining that plaintiff failed to prove that he was actually
disabled but proved that he was regarded as disabled). The plaintiff did not pro-
vide sufficient medical evidence to prove that his condition would persist for a
sufficient period of time to constitute an actual disability. See id. (explaining plain-
tiffs failure to prove actual disability).
81. See id. (analyzing evidence regarding reasonable accommodation). The
court merely examined the evidence and determined that reasonable accommoda-
tion could have been granted. See id. (noting that possible accommodations could
have been reduction in hours or salary). The court did not discuss whether the
ADA required the employer to provide reasonable accommodation to a "regarded
as" employee. See id. (failing to discuss requirement).
82. 172 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218 (D. Me. 2001) (holding that reasonable accom-
modation is required for "regarded as" disabled plaintiffs).
83. See id. at 214 (stating facts). Throughout his sick leave,Jewell's supervisor
promised him a position when he recuperated. See id. at 214-15 (discussing plain-
tiffs communication with employer).
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job.8 4 Based on Katz, Reid's Confectionary was required to provide rea-
sonable accommodation. 85 Additionally, the court rejected the disparate
treatment argument delineated in Weber, noting that if an employer fails to
engage in the interactive process, it is reasonable to hold the employer
accountable. 8
6
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
provided a persuasive analysis in favor of a reasonable accommodation re-
quirement for "regarded as" disabled employees in Jacques v. DiMarzio,
Inc.87 In fact, the Jacques opinion persuaded the Third Circuit to change
its view on reasonable accommodation. 88 The plaintiff in Jacques, an em-
ployee at a guitar factory, suffered from bipolar disorder and major de-
pression. 89 He was terminated after numerous incidents with co-workers
and after making complaints about the working conditions. 90 The court
determined that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of "regarded
as" disabled.9 1 Initially, the court did not explicitly address the issue of
whether reasonable accommodation was required; it merely noted that a
triable issue existed as to whether the plaintiff could perform with accom-
modation. 9 2 Shortly after its decision, the court learned of Weber and is-
sued a supplemental decision to address the issue of accommodation.9 3
84. See id. at 217-18 (examining evidence of disability claims).
85. See id. at 218-19 (interpreting Katz precedent to require reasonable
accommodation).
86. See id. (citing Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999))
(discussing disparity of treatment argument in Weber). The court stated:
If an employer fails to explore an employee's need for a reasonable ac-
commodation when the employer wrongly regards the employee as being
disabled, opting instead to take adverse action against the employee, it is
hardly a "bizarre" result to hold the employer accountable. Indeed, the
purpose of the ADA was, in part, to punish employers for making just this
sort of "stereotypic [assumption] not truly indicative of the individual
ability" of their employees.
Id. at 219 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7) (2005)).
87. 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 163-71 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (providing full analysis of
reasons for reasonable accommodation requirement for "regarded as" employees).
88. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 773 (3d Cir.
2004) ("We also find Judge Block's analysis in Jacques particularly persuasive, and
will largely track his approach . . . ."), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725 (2005). For
further discussion of the Third Circuit's previous comments on the requirement of
reasonable accommodation and its decision in Williams, see infra note 107 and
accompanying text.
89. See Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (explaining plaintiff's history of psychi-
atric problems). The court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim
for actual disability and a record of disability. See id. at 157-59 (determining that
plaintiff did not prove substantial limitation in major life activity).
90. See id. at 155 (mentioning reasons provided by employer as reason for
termination).
91. See id. at 161 (concluding that plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to
meet burden).
92. See id. (recognizing that triable issue exists).
93. See id. at 163-71 (providing detailed reasoning for existence of require-
ment). The court decided to address the issue sua sponte after learning of the
1224
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With respect to "regarded as" disabled employees, the court disagreed
with the Weber decision citing the plain language and legislative history of
the ADA, the mandatory interactive process between employers and em-
ployees and other courts' critiques of Weber as support for its rejection of
Weber.9 4 First, the court noted that the plain language of the ADA does
not differentiate between plaintiffs who are "regarded as" disabled and
plaintiffs who are actually disabled.95 Second, according to the court, the
legislative history of the ADA expressed congressional intent to codify the
Supreme Court decision in Arline specifically, it demonstrated that Con-
gress intended to entitle "regarded as" plaintiffs to reasonable
accommodation.
96
The court also recognized that often simply informing an employer
that they have misperceived an employee's ability does not cease the dis-
crimination. 97 Thus, reasonable accommodation is required to "counter
the prejudices of employers and co-workers who, in the absence of accom-
modation, may otherwise erroneously perpetuate a disabling view of a dis-
charged employee's non-disabling impairment."98 Moreover, the court
reasoned that completely denying a requirement of reasonable accommo-
dation would allow the stereotypes and misperceptions that Congress was
trying to combat to continue.9 9 Additionally, the court considered that
the interactive process, which many courts consider mandatory, allows the
Weber decision. See id. at 163-64 (deciding to reconsider original decision, which
did not provide reasonable accommodation analysis).
94. See id. at 166 (outlining analysis).
95. See id. (examining language of statute).
96. See id. at 166-67 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (III) (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453) (examining legislative history).
97. See id. at 167 (citing Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12
(3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (asserting need for accommodation). The court pro-
vided two examples to demonstrate the need for accommodations:
1) Plaintiff A, a police officer, has a mild form of multiple sclerosis. Even
though he is not disabled under the ADA, his employer has learned of
the impairment and mistakenly believes that it substantially limits his
ability to work. Many of his fellow officers also know of the impair-
ment, and as a consequence, refuse to work with him for fear that he
will be an unreliable partner. He is fired.
2) Plaintiff B, an office worker, has a mild form of schizophrenia. Even
though she is not disabled under the ADA, her employer has learned
of the impairment and mistakenly believes that it substantially limits
her ability to interact with others. Many of her co-workers also know
of the impairment, and as a consequence, believe her to be "crazy."
She is unable to interact with her co-workers because of their attitudes
and is fired.
In both of these scenarios, the plaintiffs are not disabled by their impair-
ments, but are substantially limited "as a result of the attitudes of others
toward their impairment[s]."
Id. at 167-68 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (2) (2002)).
98. Id. at 168.
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employer to determine what, if any, accommodation an employee may
need.1 00 The court recognized that this is an easy way to prevent qualified
individuals from unnecessarily losing their jobs.10 1
The last part of the court's analysis entailed a critique of Weber.
10 2
The court rejected the Weber argument that a requirement of accommoda-
tion would result in the differential treatment of similarly situated, non-
disabled or equally impaired individuals.10 3 The court noted that two im-
paired individuals of whom only one is "regarded as" disabled are not simi-
larly situated; one is only impaired, while the other is impaired and further
hindered by the stereotypes or misperceptions of others. 10 4 For all of
these reasons, the court concluded that the requirement of reasonable
accommodation for "regarded as" employees is not a "bizarre result."10
5
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
The question of whether reasonable accommodation is required was
an issue of first impression for the Third Circuit in Williams.10 6 The court
had previously approached the issue in dicta, however, and suggested that
it would find no requirement of reasonable accommodation. 10 7 The
court examined the plain language of the ADA, the legislative history, the
100. See id. at 168-70 (recognizing that many federal courts require employers
to participate in interactive process). For further discussion of the interactive pro-
cess, see infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
101. See Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 170 (describing interactive process as sim-
ple tool to prevent discrimination).
102. See id. at 170-71 (citing Weber v. Strippit, 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir.
1999)) (rejecting bizarre result holding of Weber).
103. See id. (discussing Weber holding).
104. See id. (explaining faulty reasoning in Weber). The court also rejected the
argument that such a requirement would permit non-disabled employees to force
accommodations on their employer by threatening a lawsuit. See id. (rejecting as-
sertion in Weber of potential frivolous lawsuits). The court simply pointed to the
good faith requirement under the ADA. See id. (illustrating protection inherent in
ADA against frivolous lawsuits).
105. See id. at 171 (concluding that accommodations are required under
ADA).
106. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 773 (3d Cir.
2004) (regarding issue as one of first impression), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725
(2005).
107. See, e.g., Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2002)
(recognizing split among courts and both sides of argument); Taylor v. Pathmark
Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that language of ADA re-
quires accommodation for "regarded as" disabled employees but recognizing po-
tential of odd outcomes); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148-49 n.12
(3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (acknowledging considerable force of argument for no
accommodation requirement but not deciding issue). "[I]t seems odd to give an
impaired but not disabled person a windfall because of her employer's erroneous
perception of disability, when other impaired but not disabled people are not enti-
tled to accommodation." Taylor, 177 F.3d at 196.
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Supreme Court's decision in Arline and the windfall proposition.' 0 8 This
analysis led the court to conclude-despite its previous dicta-that em-
ployees who are "regarded as" disabled are entitled to reasonable accom-
modation. 10 9 Although the court recognized that there may be instances
in which the requirement would produce "bizarre results," it was unwilling
to create a bright-line rejection of such entitlement. 1 0
A. The Facts: Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority
Police Department
Facts are extremely important when determining claims under the
ADA because these kinds of cases focus not only on the disability but also
on its effect on the individual's life."' In Williams, Edward Williams
worked as a police officer for the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police
Department (PHA) for twenty-four years before his termination."l 2 In re-
sponse to a confrontation with a supervisor, Williams yelled profanities
and made threatening remarks, which resulted in his immediate suspen-
sion without pay. 113 The PHA then required Williams to undergo a psy-
chological examination. 114  Williams requested a medical leave of
absence, which the PHA granted.
1 1 5
108. For further discussion of the court's analysis, see infra notes 125-56 and
accompanying text.
109. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (holding that reasonable accommodation
requirement applies to "regarded as" disabled plaintiffs).
110. See id. (stating that lack of reason for applying "across-the-board" refusal
is based on text of ADA).
111. See Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 2001)
(explaining importance of facts in ADA claims). "The determination of whether
an individual has a disability is ... based ... on the effect of that impairment on
the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disabling for particular indi-
viduals but not for others." Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996)
(citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 402 (1996)).
112. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 756 (discussing facts).
113. See id. (describing confrontation with supervisor). In a conversation with
a counselor after the confrontation, Williams made comments about shooting peo-
ple and being able to do it. See id. (reporting statements made by Williams to
counselor about "going postal"). The Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) told
Williams to report for a new assignment in the PHA radio room, but he did not
return and called in sick daily. See id. (explaining beginning stages of communica-
tion between Williams and PHA).
114. See id. (noting that Williams attended three appointments with PHA
psychologist).
115. See id. (outlining action by parties during summer of 1998). Williams
provided the PRA with the counselor's report that he was suffering from severe
and recurrent major depression. See id. (recounting diagnosis). Shortly before the
expiration of his sick leave, the PHA notified Williams that he needed to request a
leave of absence or otherwise he would be treated as having voluntarily resigned.
See id. (acknowledging Williams's employment status at expiration of his sick
leave). Williams applied for a leave of absence after receiving a second request
from the PHA. See id. (discussing Williams's application for leave of absence).
2005] CASEBRIEF 1227
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Dr. Finley, the PHA's psychologist, evaluated Williams on three occa-
sions. 116 Subsequently, Dr. Finley determined that Williams was not ready
to return to active duty, required further psychological treatment, could
return to an alternative work assignment and should be reevaluated after
three months. 117 Additionally, Dr. Finley reported to the PHA that Wil-
liams was able to return to non-active duty and should not carry a
weapon.118
After receiving clearance from Dr. Finley, Williams requested assign-
ment to the training unit.'1 9 The PHA denied that request, and Williams
then requested assignment to the radio room. 120 The PHA, however, did
not respond to that request but notified Williams that he had exhausted
his leave time and would face termination unless he requested a medical
leave of absence. 12 1 Williams did not respond and was subsequently termi-
nated. 122 Following his termination, Williams commenced a lawsuit
against the PHA in the district court. 123 The district court granted sum-
116. See id. at 756-57 (referring to Williams's contact with PHA psychologist).
Dr. Levitt, Williams's personal psychologist, also sent a letter to the PHA at Wil-
liams's request that he was ready to return to work. See id. (displaying pertinent
parts of letter). The letter noted that Williams requested minimal contact with the
supervisor, who was involved in the confrontation, upon his return. See id. (discuss-
ing Williams's request).
117. See id. at 757 (indicating PHA psychologist's opinion on Williams's condi-
tion). The doctor also noted that the tension between Williams and the supervisor
exacerbated his condition. See id. (discussing doctor's evaluation).
118. See id. (acknowledging doctor's recommendation). "Mr. Williams is fully
capable of working, for a temporary period, in either an administrative and/or
clerical capacity. He should not carry a weapon, however, for a minimum period
of three months. He can work around other officers who will be wearing their
weapon." Id. Dr. Finley also informed the PHA that she would not be treating
Williams on an ongoing basis. See id. (explaining termination of treatment). She
anticipated that Williams would be able to return to active duty after the three
month period, but a reevaluation would need to be done at that time. See id. (pro-
viding prognosis that Williams could fully return to active duty after three month
period).
119. See id. (stating Williams's initial request).
120. See id. (discussing communication between PHA and Williams). The
PHA informed Williams that he was not qualified to work in the training room due
to his ongoing treatment with Dr. Finley and her recommendation that he not
carry a gun for a three month period. See id. (noting response to Williams's re-
quest for training unit).
121. See id. at 757-58 (noting final action by PHA). The court determined
that the PHA did not respond to Williams's request for assignment to the radio
room until he commenced the lawsuit. See id. at 757 n.1 (recognizing that record
is unclear as to whether PHA responded but assuming that it did not respond for
summary judgment purposes).
122. See id. (explaining attempts by PHA to have Williams apply for medical
leave of absence and his failure, which resulted in his termination).
123. See id. at 758 (discussing initiation of lawsuit).
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mary judgment in favor of the PHA on the claims and Williams
appealed.
124
B. The Third Circuit's Reasoning
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's finding that
Williams was not actually disabled. 1 25 The Third Circuit found an actual
disability because Williams was substantially limited in the major life activ-
ity of working; specifically, he was unable to carry a firearm and was there-
fore restricted from a class of jobs-law enforcement.126 The court also
determined that Williams provided sufficient evidence to survive summary
judgment on his "regarded as" disabled claim and therefore presented a
prima facie case for discrimination under the ADA. 127 Next, the court
addressed the PHA's argument that reasonable accommodation is not re-
quired for a "regarded as" disabled employee.1 28 Noting the circuit split,
the court found the reasoning of Jacques persuasive and rejected those
opinions that found no accommodation requirement. 129 The court ac-
124. See id. (explaining procedural background). Williams asserted multiple
claims, but only the discrimination claims under the ADA and the state law sur-
vived the PHA's motion to dismiss. See id. (discussing Williams's claims).
125. See id. at 766-67 (concluding that reasonable jury could find that Wil-
liams was actually disabled).
126. See id. at 763 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i) (2001)) (explaining that
substantial limitation can be restriction from class of jobs or broad range of jobs).
For discussion of the relevant language of the ADA, see supra notes 6-10 and ac-
companying text.
127. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 767-72 (analyzing evidence and determining that
material dispute as to facts existed). The court stated:
To establish a primafacie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff
must therefore show "(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of
the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions
of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer;
and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a
result of discrimination."
Id. at 761 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir.
1999) (quoting Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998)
(internal citation omitted))). Williams was "regarded as" disabled because the
PHA believed that he could not be around people with weapons, in addition to not
being able to carry a firearm himself. See id. at 768 (explaining PHA's mispercep-
tion). The court considered numerous factors in reaching the conclusion that
Williams was excluded from a class ofjobs. See id. at 762-67 (discussing substantial
limitations on Williams due to his condition).
128. See id. at 772-73 (addressing PHA's argument).
129. See id. at 773 (indicating division among federal courts). For a discussion
of Jacques, see supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text. The court briefly ana-
lyzed the Ninth and Eighth Circuit decisions and their acknowledgment of the
plain language of the ADA. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 773-74 (citing Kaplan v. City
of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186
F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999)) (summarizing analysis of decisions). Despite the
language, both courts determined that requiring reasonable accommodation in
"regarded as" cases would lead to "bizarre results." See id. (same). For a discussion
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knowledged that applying the plain language of the ADA could lead to
"bizarre results" in some cases but saw no reason "for an across-the-board
refusal." 130
1. The Plain Language of the ADA
In reaching its decision, the court first examined the plain language
of the ADA. 13 1 It noted that the ADA's definition of discrimination in-
cludes not making reasonable accommodation for a qualified individ-
ual. 132 Additionally, the court recognized that the definition of disability
also includes persons who are "regarded as" disabled.133 "[A] s all would
agree, the statutory text of the ADA does not in any way 'distinguish be-
tween [actually] disabled and "regarded as" individuals in requiring
accommodation.' "134
2. The Legislative History
The Third Circuit found that the legislative history of the ADA also
demonstrates that reasonable accommodation is required for employees
who are "regarded as" disabled.1 35 Specifically, the court interpreted the
legislative history to confirm the plain language of the statute. 136 The leg-
islative history also reflects Congress's intent to codify the Supreme
Court's analysis in Arline, namely, that the misperception of others can be
disabling even if a person is not actually impaired. 13 7 The ADA protects
people who are "regarded as" disabled in the same way it protects people
who are actually disabled.13 8 "This case demonstrates the wisdom of that
conclusion, in that but for PHA's erroneous perception that Williams was
unable to be around firearms because of his mental impairment, Williams
would have been eligible for a radio room assignment."1 39
130. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (announcing that court will apply plain lan-
guage of ADA in present case).
131. See id. (examining pertinent sections of ADA).
132. See id. (defining discrimination under ADA). For the pertinent language
of the statute, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
133. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (noting definition of disability). For the
language of the ADA, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
134. Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (quoting Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177
F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999)).
135. See id. (examining legislative history).
136. See id. (same).
137. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101485 (III) (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450) (noting legislative intent).
138. See id. (explaining purpose of ADA's protection of "regarded as"
individuals).
139. Id.
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3. The Supreme Court's Decision in Arline
The court then turned to the Supreme Court's decision in Arline.
140
In Arline, the Court explained that the definition of a handicapped indi-
vidual under the Rehabilitation Act had been expanded to include indi-
viduals who may be misperceived as having an impairment. 1 41 After it
determined that the plaintiff in that case fell into the "regarded as" cate-
gory, the Supreme Court stated that employers had an "affirmative obliga-
tion" to make reasonable accommodation for employees who are
"regarded as" disabled. 1 42 Moreover, the Court noted that the "regarded
as" sections of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are virtually identical
and the ADA must be read to provide "at least as much protection as pro-
vided by... the Rehabilitation Act." 143 Therefore, the logical conclusion
is that employees under the ADA are also entitled to reasonable accommo-
dation if they are misperceived as being disabled.' 44 The Third Circuit
pointed out that neither the Weber nor Kaplan courts addressed Arline in
their decisions.
1 45
4. The "Windfall" Proposition
One of the main arguments against requiring reasonable accommo-
dation is that "regarded as" individuals could receive a windfall.146 Essen-
tially, the PHA argued that Williams would receive a windfall if the court
determined that reasonable accommodation was required-Williams
would be accommodated, while another similarly situated individual
would not be accommodated. 1 47 The problem with this argument is that
the PHA misperceived Williams's ability to be around others with weapons,
140. See id. at 775 (seeking guidance from Arline for ADA claims). For a more
in depth discussion of Arline, see supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
141. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987)) (detailing reasoning of Supreme Court).
142. See id. (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 n.19) (stating significance of Arline).
143. See id. (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998)) (emphasizing
role of "regarded as" sections in statutory scheme of both acts and well-established
rule of extent of protection afforded by ADA).
144. See id. (drawing "inescapable conclusion"). Again, Congress intended to
codify the Arline interpretation when it enacted the ADA. See id. (repeating legisla-
tive intent).
145. See id. (implying lack of complete analysis in other circuits' decisions).
For a discussion of Weber and Kaplan, see supra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir.
2003) (suggesting that employees would be in better position for lawsuit if their
employer misperceived them as disabled); cf Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.
Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that "regarded as" plaintiff is impaired
by misperception of disability). For a general discussion of how ADA defendants
are more likely to receive a windfall, see Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 108 (1999) (analyzing
outcomes of cases under ADA). Defendants often prevail generally through sum-
mary judgment or dismissal of cases. See id. (examining ADA cases).
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a fact contradicted by the PHA's psychologist. 148 As a result of this mis-
perception, the PHA refused to assign Williams to the radio room. 149 The
argument failed because another employee with a condition similar to Wil-
liams's would have been assigned to the radio room if the PHA did not
misperceive the extent of the employee's condition as it did in Williams's
case. 15° "The employee whose limitations are perceived accurately gets to
work, while Williams is sent home unpaid."151 The Third Circuit viewed
this as a clear example of the disabling effect of misperceptions, and the
situation Congress was trying to guard against when it included "regarded
as" within the definition of disability.
15 2
The court concluded its discussion by noting that a simple solution
may not always exist. 15 3 Therefore, it is crucial for an employer to engage
in the interactive process to communicate with the employee. 15 4 The
PHA's refusal to grant Williams's request was a refusal to provide reasona-
ble accommodation. 1 55 The court was clear that an employer will be held
148. See id. (discussing misperceptions). For a discussion of the PHA psychol-
ogist's opinion, see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of the PHA's refusal/inaction in assigning Williams to
the radio room, see supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
150. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775 (rejecting PHA's argument regarding simi-
larly situated employees).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 776 (promoting importance of "regarded as" provision in pro-
tecting against discrimination based on misperceptions). For further discussion
on the legislative history, see supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text. See also
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2005) (stating congressional findings and purpose of
Act). The purpose of the Act is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."
Id. § 12101 (b) (1). In these types of cases, the simple solution of an accommoda-
tion may easily be reached between the employer and employee. See Williams, 380
F.3d at 776 n.19 (discussing availability of reasonable accommodation). The court
noted:
For example, an employer supermarket requires all of its cashiers to
stand. One cashier has a back problem that causes discomfort but does
not amount to an actual disability. The employer misperceives this back
problem as one that prevents the employee from standing for more than
an hour, and fires the employee because she cannot stand. Even if the
supermarket and cashier never reach a meeting of the minds as to the
true extent of the cashier's limitations, the supermarket might, assuming
its erroneous perception amounted to a substantial limitation of a major
life activity, be required to reasonably accommodate such a "regarded as"
disabled employee by, for example, providing a stool.
Id.
153. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 776 n.19 (explaining that more extensive accom-
modations were required in present case).
154. See id. (discussing importance of interactive process). See generally id. at
771-72 (explaining requirement that parties work together to find mutually agreea-
ble solution).
155. See id. (emphasizing discrimination that occurred). One commentator
stated:
The court also rejected PHA's suggestion that an employee must demon-
strate the existence of a vacant position he was capable of performing in
1232
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liable for not making reasonable accommodation if: (1) it perceives an
employee as being unable to work; and (2) it does not make a good faith
effort to determine an employee's actual limitations.
156
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT WILLIAMs V. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORTY
POLICE DEPARTMENT REALLY MEANS
Williams makes clear that employers in the Third Circuit should en-
gage in the interactive process with employees seeking reasonable accom-
modations under the ADA. 15 7 The interactive process will allow the
employer to determine the extent of the employee's disability and what
kind of reasonable accommodation might be necessary. 158 Any mis-
perception could potentially be resolved during this process. 159 Deter-
mining exactly what, if any, accommodations would be necessary during
the eyes of the employer, even if the employer wrongly perceives the em-
ployee's limitations. Thus, according to PHA, Williams' claim failed be-
cause there were no jobs he could have performed given its
misperception that he could not be around others who carried or had
access to firearms. The court stated that this argument would make the
"regarded as" protection meaningless.
Gary S. Marx, Third Circuit Rules That Police Officer Regarded as Disabled Is Entitled to
Reasonable Accommodation, 12 No. 10 DIsABILITY L. COMPLIANCE REP. 1 (Oct. 2004).
156. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 771-72 (noting potential liability for PHA if jury
found that it erroneously perceived Williams's limitations and general require-
ment for employers to determine actual disability).
157. See Maureen Q. Dwyer, Labor & Employment Law Update: Reasonable Accom-
modations for Employees 'Regarded As' Disabled (Jan. 2005), at http://www.pepperlaw.
com (discussing implications of Williams decision). "This decision creates no new
obligations for employers but rather demonstrates the importance of gathering
and acting upon all necessary information in possible accommodation situations."
Long, supra note 2, at 5.
158. See Long, supra note 2, at 5 (explaining importance of employers engag-
ing in process in good faith to prevent potential liability); see also Williams, 380 F.3d
at 776 n.19 (asserting interactive process can help reduce misperceptions by em-
ployers). The type of accommodation to be afforded is based on the facts of the
case. See ADA Questions and Answers, supra note 9 (explaining how to determine
appropriate accommodation for disabled individual). The source further
provides:
[T] he principal test is that of effectiveness, i.e. whether the accommoda-
tion will provide an opportunity for a person with a disability to achieve
the same level of performance and to enjoy benefits equal to those of an
average, similarly situated person without a disability. However, the ac-
commodation does not have to ensure equal results or provide exactly
the same benefits.
Id.
159. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 776 n.19 (noting benefits of process); cf. Jacques
v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (asserting that simply
notifying employer of misperception will not always suffice to remedy situation).
The Third Circuit recognized a limited defense of reasonable mistake for employ-
ers in "regarded as" claims. See M. ELAINE JOCABY, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES:
DESIGNING AN EFFECTrvE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
§ 1:119 (2003) (citing Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999))
(discussing various employer defenses under ADA). An employer can claim the
defense if it can prove that the employee is responsible for the misperception and
21
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this process would also resolve the fear of the Kaplan court that reasonable
accommodation in this context might be a waste of resources or a windfall
for plaintiffs.1
60
As the court recognized in Jacques, two individuals are not similarly
situated, even if they have the same condition, when only one is perceived
as having the condition or a related impairment. 6 1 There will be no dis-
parate treatment, as the court suggested in Weber, however, if the employer
engages in the interactive process and determines whether any reasonable
accommodation is required.162 As the courts in both Jewell and Jacques
discussed, it is not unreasonable to hold employers accountable if they fail
to communicate with employees in order to determine the extent of their
disability or the accommodation that would be required. 1 63 The legisla-
tive intent and the language of the ADA are clear that Congress intended
to protect individuals who are "regarded as" disabled under the ADA.
1 64
Until Congress says differently, all of the protections encapsulated in the
ADA should be afforded to such individuals.'
65
that the perception is not based on "impermissible stereotypes." See id. (explaining
defense).
160. For a discussion of the Kaplan court's analysis on why there is no require-
ment of reasonable accommodation, see supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of the differential treatment argument in Jacques, see
supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the mandatory interactive process in Jacques, see supra
notes 100-01 and accompanying text. "If an employer properly engages in the
interactive process and gathers all necessary information .. .the employer should
not erroneously regard an individual as disabled." Long, supra note 2, at 5.
163. For a discussion of Jewell and Jacques, see supra notes 82-105 and accom-
panying text.
164. For a discussion of the legislative history of the "regarded as" prong of
the ADA, see supra notes 96, 135-39 and accompanying text. Clearly not everyone
agrees that reasonable accommodation should be afforded to "regarded as" dis-
abled employees. See Travis, supra note 20, at 902 (arguing that providing accom-
modation to "regarded as" employees is unfair because they already have equal
opportunity). Although Congress intended to protect "regarded as" disabled em-
ployees, one commentator suggested that Congress intended the protection to be
different than that afforded to actually disabled employees. See id. at 939-45
(same).
165. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir.
2004) (examining plain language of statute and legislative history), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 1725 (2005);Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (discussing interpretation of ADA). "The EEOC 'has not taken an official
position' on whether the reasonable accommodations . . . should apply to per-
ceived disability claims." Travis, supra note 20, at 933 (citing Deane v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (noting lack of explicit
guidance from EEOC for courts deciding issue). For a further discussion on
EEOC guidelines in this area, see Travis, supra note 20, at 936-43 (arguing that
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Still unclear, however, is what the Third Circuit would consider a "bi-
zarre result. 1 66 Based on its disclaimer, the court did not rule out the
possibility that there may be situations in which the requirement would
lead to odd results.167 As one commentator noted, the plaintiff in Wil-
liams, like the plaintiff in Katz, had an actual disability and was therefore
already entitled to reasonable accommodation.1 68 Thus, a claim involving
a truly non-disabled employee may provide a situation in which reasonable
accommodation is not required. 169 In other words, if an employee is not
disabled, then no reasonable accommodation would be necessary to en-
able him or her to perform the job.170 Such an issue should be resolved
during the mandatory interactive process in order to prevent "bizarre
results." 1
7 1
The Third Circuit enriched the current debate among the federal
courts with a well-reasoned analysis and its decision that reasonable ac-
commodation is required for "regarded as" disabled employees under the
166. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (leaving open possibility that situation could
arise where requirement would not be needed).
167. See id. (explaining when accommodations might not be required).
"While the court clearly intended its decision to be definitive, the decision may be
less than it initially appears." Sid Steinberg, Are Accommodations Due Employees 'Re-
garded As' Disabled?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 13, 2004, at 5. The court's
example of an employee in a supermarket being misperceived as having a back
problem and needing a stool may be the type of odd result the court suggested.
See id. (suggesting that example leads to bizarre result because employee becomes
entitled to accommodation they would not otherwise receive). For the hypotheti-
cal used by the court, see supra note 152.
168. See Steinberg, supra note 167, at 5 (explaining lack of clarity in Third
Circuit's decision).
169. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (recognizing possibility of case where no
reasonable accommodations are required). "[E]ven where an employer mistak-
enly regards an employee as so disabled that the employee cannot work at all, the
employer still must accommodate a 'regarded as' employee by seeking to deter-
mine, in good faith, the extent of the employee's actual limitations." Id. at 776
n.19. "While the Williams decision may lead to an increase in 'regarded as' claims,
it appears that there may still be an open question of whether a 'not disabled but
regarded as such' employee is entitled to reasonable accommodation as a matter
of law." Steinberg, supra note 167, at 5.
170. See Job Accommodation Network, The ADA: Your Responsibilities as an
Employer, at http://www.jan.wvu.edu/media/EMPLOYERRESP.html (last updated
Jan. 29, 2004) (defining reasonable accommodation as change or adjustment that
enables employee to perform essential job functions). "The best way to [deter-
mine what reasonable accommodation is necessary] . . .is to consult informally
with the applicant or employee about potential accommodations that would en-
able the individual to participate in the application process or perform essential
functions of the job." Id.
171. SeeJacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
("It is clearly a mechanism to allow for early intervention by an employer, outside
of the legal forum, for exploring reasonable accommodations for employees who
are perceived to be disabled."). For a further discussion of the interactive process,
see supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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ADA. 172 Other courts may follow the Third Circuit, especially considering
that decisions like Kaplan and Weber were partly based on previous Third
Circuit dicta.173 Thus, attorneys in the Third Circuit should counsel their
clients that it is essential that they engage in the interactive process with
any and all employees who may be disabled before taking any adverse ac-
tion.17 4 The interactive process may prevent waste of limited resources
and disparate treatment, while allowing for the necessary and reasonable
accommodations required under the ADA without litigation.' 7
5
Mdire E. Donovan
172. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis, see supra notes 125-56
and accompanying text. At least one commentator opined that the court's reason-
ing in Williams is problematic on certain grounds. See Steinberg, supra note 167, at
5 (arguing that court's analysis is circular but promotes importance of interactive
process).
173. For a discussion of Kaplan and Weber, see supra notes 50-75 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of previous dicta by the Third Circuit, see supra note
107.
174. See Long, supra note 2, at 5 (emphasizing need for employers to engage
in interactive process). Employers should take precautionary measures by engag-
ing in the interactive process. See id. (explaining significance of Third Circuit's
decision).
175. See Dep't of Labor, Accommodations Get the Job Done, at http://www.dol.
gov/odep/pubs/fact/accomod.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (explaining impor-
tance of cooperation between employee and employer in deter-mining reasonable
accommodation). "Accommodations are developed on an individual basis and in
a partnership between the person with the disability and the employer. This team-
work generally results in cost-effective solutions." Id. Some examples of disabilities
and suggested reasonable accommodations are:
(1) Problem: A clerk with low back strain/sprain has limitations in lift-
ing, bending, and squatting, all results of lower back injury. The job
requires mail sorting and filing incoming documents in a large nu-
merical filing system.
Solution: Both the clerk and the documents are put on wheels! A
rolling file stool is supplied for use when filing at lower levels, and
upper-drawer filing is done with documents on a rolling cart, without
need to lift or bend. COST: $44.
(2) Problem: A receptionist who is blind works at a law firm. She cannot
see the lights on the phone console which indicate which telephone
lines are ringing, on hold, or in use by staff.
Solution: The employer purchases a light-probe, a penlike product
which detects a lighted button. COST: $45.
(3) Problem: A clerk-typist with severe depression and problems with al-
coholism experiences problems with the quality and quantity of her
work.
Solution: Employee is provided with extended sick leave to cover a
short period of hospitalization and a modified work schedule to at-
tend weekly psychotherapy treatment. Treatment is covered by com-
pany medical plan. COST: $0.
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